

# EXTRAC

AHEAD OF TOMORROW

## WEEKLY MONITOR

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### Russia

24 Mar 26

Cut-off time: 1000Z 23 Mar 26

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## BLUF

From 16 to 23 Mar 26, Russia's Security Council secretary Sergei Shoigu stated **the Urals were now 'in the zone of direct threat,'** while the Russian government submitted legislation enabling armed forces deployment abroad to protect citizens prosecuted under foreign court decisions.

Russian sources will highly likely\* continue signalling commitment to **contesting the High North and framing Ukrainian energy strikes as a systemic market risk** to pressure European governments.

On the ground in Ukraine, **pro-Kremlin sources rejected restraint in targeting and discussed nuclear use scenarios.** Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov framed Moscow as available for talks, casting Ukraine as 'the main brake' on settlement.

Russian sources were conflicted over Kupyansk, with several reporting Ukrainian forces had taken 'almost all' of the city. The prominent pro-Kremlin blog Rybar was explicit that **large-scale operations along the Sumy border were not currently feasible.**

In Moldova, **a Russian strike on Ukraine's Novodnistrovsk energy complex on 16 Mar 26 left thousands without water.** Russian sources labelled Chişinău's accusations a 'PR campaign.'

**Critique of the war within Russia's information ecosystem is likely to reflect a segmented public mood,** while Russian activity in Moldova highly likely aims to complicate Western security alignment by converting economic and environmental narratives into pressure on Chişinău.

\*Probabilistic language adheres to the PHIA Yardstick.

## 1 | Russia on NATO

At a field meeting in the Urals Federal District on 17 Mar 26, Shoigu stated that 'not long ago, the Urals were unreachable for aerial strikes from Ukrainian territory, but today they are already in the zone of direct threat.'<sup>[1]</sup> He added that 'not one region of Russia can feel safe' given Ukrainian unmanned aerial system (UAS) development, and accused Western states of pooling intelligence resources to prepare sabotage attacks on Russian targets.<sup>[2]</sup>

The Russian government submitted a bill to the State Duma on 19 Mar 26 amending laws on citizenship and defence, granting the president authority to deploy armed forces abroad to protect Russian citizens prosecuted under court decisions not recognised by Russia.<sup>[3][4]</sup> Pro-Kremlin sources framed this within a broader deterrence posture, and threatened a large-scale military response 'with all available means' if Europe attacks Russia.<sup>[5]</sup> One commentator characterised NATO as an instrument for force 'dislocation' and US control of European territory.<sup>[6][7]</sup>

NATO Ex COLD RESPONSE 2026 featured prominently, with Russian sources citing the Russian embassy in London accusing the UK of seeking to militarise the Arctic, pointing to British plans to double troop numbers in Norway and participate in NATO's ARCTIC SENTRY mission.<sup>[8]</sup> Ex COLD RESPONSE 2026 was framed not as routine readiness but as rehearsal for covert littoral access, with Russian sources reporting UK commandos inserting clandestinely from the German Type-212A submarine S185 to establish observation and artillery correction positions in northern Norway.<sup>[9]</sup>

Russian sources presented Russian naval activity in the Barents Sea as proportional to that conducted under Ex COLD RESPONSE, reporting that a Yasen/Kazan-class submarine conducted P-800 Oniks cruise missile launches,

which some sources framed explicitly as an 'answer' to NATO.<sup>[10]</sup> Russian sources shared Finnish media reporting claiming increased NATO intercepts of Russian aircraft along the Norwegian coast and attributed disruption to Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) to Russian electronic warfare.<sup>[11]</sup>

Pro-Kremlin sources discussed the call by the commander of NATO's Allied Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) to extend the NATO Pipeline System - a Europe-wide fuel supply network for military operations - 'hundreds of kilometres eastward,' citing an Oct 25 NATO-Poland expansion of approximately 300 km.<sup>[12]</sup> They frame further extension into the Baltic states and Finland as enabling rapid reinforcement near Russia's borders.

Russian sources claimed the Saab 340 AEW&C Erieye system had appeared over Ukraine and would integrate with F-16s, ground-based surface-to-air missile systems, and UAS-interceptor units, with detection ranges asserted at up to 370 km for fighter-sized targets.<sup>[13][14]</sup> France's reported loan of an SAMP/T NG air defence system was paired with the claim that Ukraine held 'no more than six' ASTER missiles, arguing Western support raises Ukrainian capability ceilings but cannot sustain them.<sup>[15]</sup>

Pro-Kremlin sources rejected 'war in white gloves' - a phrase used to accuse Russian commanders of excessive caution - and demanded broader strike permissiveness.<sup>[16][17]</sup> Nuclear-use scenarios were normalised via assertions that 'nuclear is inevitable' and discussions of tactical warheads.<sup>[18][19]</sup> Commentary also questioned NATO Article 5 applicability when a member state initiates strikes, framing collective defence as legally and politically constrained.<sup>[20]</sup>

## 2 | Russia and Ukraine

Peskov described trilateral negotiations as in a 'situational pause' on 19 Mar 26, principally tied to 'the schedules...of American mediators.'<sup>[21][22]</sup> On 16 Mar 26, he separately accused Ukraine of being 'the main brake' on settlement.<sup>[23]</sup> Russian sources framed Moscow as available for talks, with any delay attributed to US bandwidth or Ukrainian intransigence.

Ukrainian attacks on energy infrastructure were used to reinforce this posture. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova reported attempted Ukrainian UAS attacks against compressor stations linked to TurkStream and Blue Stream, with Gazprom claiming large numbers of UAS were repelled.<sup>[24][25][26]</sup> She argued the strikes risked 'further destabilisation of the global energy market,' linked the attacks to Middle East developments, and called on partners to increase 'collective pressure' on Kyiv to cease them.<sup>[27][28]</sup> Peskov told TASS that Kyiv's actions were 'reckless' in conditions where 'the global energy market experiences discomfort.'<sup>[29]</sup>

Russian sources framed Ukraine's manpower situation as at breaking point, citing parliamentary discussion of 'one million deserters' and reducing mobilisation reserves.<sup>[30][31]</sup> Pro-Kremlin sources cited a Ukrainian officer describing the country 'sinking rapidly into...state terror' as recruiters are 'blocking main roads' in Kyiv.<sup>[32]</sup> Russian sources also amplified unofficial AWOL estimates of over one million.<sup>[33]</sup>

These narratives fed a broader argument that Ukraine lacks an authoritative counterpart for any settlement. Russian sources cited reporting that Ukraine would not hold presidential elections in 2026, branding Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy 'illegitimate.'<sup>[34][35]</sup>


Deputy Security Council Chairman Dmitry Medvedev stated Zelenskyy 'cannot be considered a legitimate participant' in negotiations, comparing efforts to restore his status to 'the reanimation of a political corpse.'<sup>[36]</sup> State Duma member Andrey Kartapolov acknowledged Zelenskyy de facto 'manages the remnants of Ukrainian statehood' but argued he should be taken alive to bear personal responsibility for crimes against both Russians and Ukrainians.<sup>[37]</sup>

Russian sources alleged a confrontation between Zelenskyy and Head of the Office of the President Kyrylo Budanov, claiming Budanov had pushed for a framework peace agreement along US President Donald Trump's track and that Zelenskyy had accused him of having presidential ambitions.<sup>[38]</sup>

Non-official discourse showed tension between long-war pragmatism and cost anxiety. Some commentary attributed the war's duration to early miscalculation and insufficient mobilisation.<sup>[39][40]</sup> Others warned that prolonged war impoverishes populations and erodes morale.<sup>[41]</sup>

Military blogger channels challenged the credibility of official reporting on military progress in Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast. Pro-Kremlin sources quoted official reports to Putin - which stated that formations of the West grouping had 'liberated...Kupyansk' - arguing that the false claim of Russian control of the city distracted from preparations for a Ukrainian counter-attack.<sup>[42]</sup> One source noted the general who reported the 'capture' and officers decorated for it faced no consequences.<sup>[43]</sup> Another observed drily that Kupyansk had been "'taken" four months ago - at least, that's what they told Putin.'<sup>[44]</sup>

Figure 1 (right). Pro-Kremlin blogger cites Ukrainian officer Yuriy Kassianov describing an atmosphere 'descending into the darkness of state terror' as Kyiv mobilisation intensifies



## 2 | Russia and Ukraine

In Kharkiv Oblast, Russian sources were conflicted over the status of the Oskil–Kupyansk axis. Several reported on 20 Mar 26 that Ukrainian forces had taken 'almost all' of Kupyansk ❶, including the Central District Hospital, implying a sharp contraction of Russian control in the centre.<sup>[45][46][47]</sup> Others pushed back, describing much of the city as a grey zone with small, shifting footholds, and calling for visual confirmation before any claims were accepted.<sup>[48][49][50]</sup>

Beyond Kupyansk, Russian sources claimed local gains east of Petropavlivka - a 'pocket' of captured strongpoints in ravines and woodbelts - alongside re-entry into Pishchane and at least part of Kurylivka.<sup>[51][52]</sup>

In Donetsk Oblast, Russian sources described movement from Stupochky towards Predtechyne ❷ and west along the T-05-04 corridor as 'compressing' Ukrainian defensive depth on the approaches to Kostiantynivka, with persistent fighting in the Shevchenkove microdistrict of Chasiv Yar treated as a key urban hinge.<sup>[53][54][55]</sup> Reporting around the Kleban-Byk Reservoir reinforced a narrative of multiple pressure lines rather than a single frontal assault.<sup>[56][57]</sup>

On the Sloviansk–Siversk line, Russian sources reported the elimination of the Reznivka pocket, capture of the Bolshoy Volchyi forest, and clearance of Ukrainian positions in the Stetskova ravine.<sup>[58][59]</sup> Fighting continued at Kryva Luka, where Russian assault troops attempted to dislodge Ukrainian forces from chalk-slope fortifications, with one source noting defenders were 'offering stubborn resistance, understanding the consequences of losing the heights.'<sup>[60]</sup>

Russian sources identified Rai-Oleksandrivka as 'the last major fortification on the approaches to Sloviansk from the

east,' the loss of which would bring Russian artillery within range of the city.<sup>[61]</sup>


In Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Russian sources reported widening positions on the Huliaipole-Haichur axis towards Staroukrainka and Zelenyi Hai ❸, with fighting around Rozhdestvenske, Vozdvyzhivka, and Verkhnia Tersa.<sup>[62][63][64]</sup> Pro-Kremlin bloggers cast Ukrainian counterattacks, including at Richne, as contained.<sup>[65][66]</sup>

Along the Sumy border, Russian sources reported the capture of Sopych ❹ and subsequent gains in Potapivka, with Ukrainian forces massing reserves from Bachevsk to Ulanove to contest advances towards the Lokna river crossings.<sup>[67][68]</sup>

The North troop group claimed advances of up to 400 metres across nine directions in a single 24-hour period.<sup>[69]</sup> The prominent pro-Kremlin blog Rybar was explicit that large-scale operations were not under consideration: 'there is no question of breakthroughs on a grand scale.'<sup>[70][71]</sup>

Russian sources attributed slow but persistent movement to sustained artillery and glide bomb strike cycles, with high UAS density making resupply increasingly dangerous – one source described supply routes near Orikhiv as 'roads of death.'<sup>[72][73]</sup> Fibre optic-controlled first-person view UAS were highlighted for vehicle and strongpoint interdiction.<sup>[74][75]</sup> Ukrainian forces were reported to be expanding layered field fortifications, described by one source as 'copying' Russian-style depth works.<sup>[76][77]</sup>

Figure 2. (right). Map showing Russian defence ministry, non-official Russian, and non-official Ukrainian claims of key (>five events) conflict-related incidents, such as missile strikes and frontline activity, in Ukraine from 16 to 23 Mar 26



### 3 | Russian Activity in Eurasia

In **Moldova**, Russian sources continued to describe Chişinău's Transnistria reintegration proposal as a 'spectacle' designed to offload responsibility onto an undefined 'international administration,' with 'not a word about real settlement' and excluding both Tiraspol and Moscow.<sup>[78][79][80]</sup> Transnistrian Foreign Minister Vitaly Ignatiev was quoted as stating that 'it is no longer a secret that it is the Moldovan side that sabotages the settlement process.'<sup>[81]</sup> Russian sources argued Moldova had 'consciously abandoned' Russian energy sources and was 'now beginning to pay for it,' citing fuel price rises of approximately 30% for diesel and 20% for petrol over three weeks.<sup>[82][83]</sup>

A Russian strike on Ukraine's Novodnistrovsk energy complex on 7 Mar 26 continued to draw attention. Thousands of Moldovans were left without water after oil products entered the Dniester river, prompting Moldovan authorities to declare a 15-day environmental alert across the Dniester basin.<sup>[84]</sup> Moldovan officials blamed 'a criminal act by the aggressor, the Russian Federation,' noting at least 1.5 tonnes of petroleum products had entered the river.<sup>[85]</sup> The Russian embassy dismissed the accusations as 'hasty and unfounded,' stating 'no evidence of our country's involvement' had been presented.<sup>[86]</sup>

In **Estonia**, Ukrainian sources described the online campaign promoting the 'Narva People's Republic,' noting its use of memes, flags, and calls for sabotage and armed resistance.<sup>[87][88]</sup> Russian and Lithuanian sources cited Bild reporting that Estonian security police had described the campaign as a disinformation operation, with intelligence services not excluding preparation for provocations 'similar to the start of the war in Ukraine in 2014.'<sup>[89][90]</sup>

In **Armenia**, Russian sources described a 'media campaign' alleging commanders at Russia's 102nd base at Gyumri had pressured Armenian citizens electorally, presenting this as disinformation attributed to figures around Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's office.<sup>[91][92]</sup>

In **Azerbaijan**, Russian sources framed Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) visits to Baku as Europeans arriving 'to entrench themselves in a new logistics reality,' forming part of an 'overtly anti-Russian agenda.'<sup>[93]</sup> Ukrainian sources argued the Trans-Caspian route was gaining importance, reducing Central Asian dependence on Russia.<sup>[94]</sup>

In **Georgia**, Russian sources claimed that in February Russia was 'the only country from which Georgia bought oil.'<sup>[95][95]</sup>

On Central Asia, Russian sources reported Moscow's legislative tightening of labour migration rules and expanded financial surveillance of migrant workers.<sup>[97][98]</sup> They also noted that a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) exercise from 16 to 19 Mar 26 focused on crisis response scenarios in Central Asia and Eastern Europe, with results feeding into larger exercises planned for Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan from Sep 26 to Oct 26.<sup>[99]</sup>

In the Western Balkans, Russian sources described Russian flags and portraits of Putin appearing at protests in Belgrade, Novi Sad, and Niš, alongside graffiti proclaiming 'Kosovo is the heart of Serbia' and 'Crimea is Russia,' framing the demonstrations as public rejection of EU integration.<sup>[100]</sup> They claimed over 80% of Serbia's population opposes anti-Russian sanctions and NATO membership.<sup>[101]</sup> Others cited Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stating he had 'no doubt' the EU expected Serbia to join the Ukraine war.<sup>[102]</sup>





Figure 3. Russian source says Moldovan Transnistria reintegration plan designed to exclude Moscow and give the EU settlement responsibility

## 4 | Assessment



Published | 20/03/2026  
16:58:49

The Saab 340 AWACS aircraft, which Sweden promised back in 2024, is being used in Ukraine. The addition of AWACS aircraft to the Ukrainian Armed Forces will significantly improve the combat effectiveness of enemy aircraft, especially F-16 fighters, with which the Saab 340s will primarily operate. Military Informant

MilitaryRussia.Ru Chat

Russia | General

Chatrooms & Forums

Pro-Kremlin, Military Analysis, Defence & Security | General

Data Source Alignment  
Russian Federation | General

Figure 4. Russian source shares footage of Saab 340 AEW&C Erieye system reportedly in use over Ukraine

Published | 19/03/2026  
20:01:27

According to reports, last Friday, during the meeting between Volodymyr Zelensky and Emmanuel Macron at the Elysée Palace in Paris, Ukraine was promised the SAMP/T NG air defense system, which will be loaned to Ukraine. Under a complex legal procedure, the system, developed for the French military by the Eurosam consortium, which brings together Thales and missile manufacturer MBDA, will formally remain in French military stockpiles. However, this loan has raised doubts in the Ukrainian military, not so much because of the terms of the agreement, but rather because of the lack of mention of the supply of new missiles. And there are good reasons for this: the system operates with ASTER missiles, stocks of which are exhausted. At a meeting between the Ukrainian and NATO armed forces last month, Kiev officials stated that they had no more than six ASTER missiles at their disposal. Since no new supplies are expected in the near future, the General Staff wants to conserve its stocks in the event of a major ballistic attack. Ukraine currently has two SAMP/T systems supplied by France and one supplied by Italy. Each system has four launchers carrying eight missiles. However, three systems have been virtually unused for several weeks due to a lack of missiles. A similar situation is likely to repeat with the last French-leased SAMP/T NG system. A Ukrainian source involved in the matter summed up the situation: "While the supplies of rifles are welcome, the availability of ammunition for them could also be useful in wartime." Orders for the ASTER missiles, which cost over €1 million, are coming in slowly. Lacking a state budget for their purchase, Kiev hopes to leverage NATO and EU programs, such as SAFE and EDIP. However, this could delay the arrival of these missiles in the theater of military operations, as production, considering current capabilities, could take several years. \*\*\* Subscribe to Russia and Surroundings t.me/RussiaeDintorni | Support us

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
Italy | General

Bloggers or Vloggers

Propaganda, Disinformation, Pro-Kremlin, Information | General, Socio-Economic | General, General Discussion

Data Source Alignment  
Russian Federation | General

Figure 5. Pro-Kremlin blogger claims Ukraine has fewer than six ASTER missiles



Published | 23/03/2026  
08:57:53

According to enemy military-related TG channels: "Heavy fighting continues in several areas along the Kupyansk front. In Kupyansk itself, according to several reports, the Russian Armed Forces have lost positions in the Kupyansk Central District Hospital, meaning the city center has effectively come under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. East of Petropavlovka, Russian units have occupied a fairly large "pocket," capturing several strongholds, ravines, and forest belts. Further south, Russian troops have retaken Peschanoye and at least part of Kurilovka. South of Peschanoye and the railway, the zone of small-scale clashes has expanded. There, the Defense Forces are attempting to hold the approaches to Stepova Novoselovka, while Russian units, in turn, are attempting to "close" this fairly large "pocket."

Диванный спецнаЗ

Russia | General

Bloggers or Vloggers

Propaganda, Disinformation, Pro-Kremlin, Information | General, Military Analysis, Conflict, Defence & Security | General

Data Source Alignment  
Russian Federation | General

Figure 6. Russian military blogger maps claimed Ukrainian gains in Kupyansk, as well as Russian advances east of Petropavlivka

Given the repeated 'response to exercises' framing, it is **highly likely** Russian sources will continue to signal Moscow's commitment to contesting the High North as a rhetorical warning against deeper NATO engagement over the next six months (to 23 Sep 26).

It is **highly likely** that Russian officials' framing of Ukrainian energy strikes as a systemic market risk - rather than a battlefield tactic - is calibrated to build pressure on European governments to constrain Ukrainian targeting decisions; these narratives will **almost certainly** intensify if Middle East instability continues to strain energy markets.

It is **likely** that critique of the Ukraine war within Russia's information ecosystem both reflects and reinforces a segmented public mood: support for war aims can coexist with rising distrust in official reporting and sharper demands either for escalation competence or a settlement locking in gains.

It is **highly likely** that the immediate Russian objective in Moldova is to complicate the information environment around Western security alignment - converting economic stress and environmental incident narratives into legitimacy pressure on Chişinău - while keeping Transnistria framed as a process that cannot proceed without Moscow.

ExTrac assessments are derived from hand-curated data feeds and provide official and population-level perspectives on geopolitical developments. They should not be read as all-source assessments, but they do describe our assessed likelihood based on the data listed in the Methodology.

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70. Russian Federation | General. X. 18 Mar 26 05:33:49. [Link to Post](#)
71. Russian Federation | General. АлешкиСегодня. Telegram. 22 Mar 26 16:53:02. [Link to Post](#)
72. Russian Federation | General. X. 20 Mar 26 04:54:18. [Link to Post](#)
73. Russian Federation | General. Рядовой на передовой. Telegram. 20 Mar 26 02:57:47. [Link to Post](#)
74. Russian Federation | General. 🗨️ ППМ. Telegram. 17 Mar 26 09:16:09. [Link to Post](#)
75. Russian Federation | General. Two Majors - English Channel. Telegram. 17 Mar 26 08:54:00. [Link to Post](#)
76. Russian Federation | General. X. 20 Mar 26 04:54:18. [Link to Pos](#)
77. Russian Federation | General. Военная хроника. Telegram. 19 Mar 26 18:55:15. [Link to Post](#)
78. Russian Federation | General. Ящик Пандоры Chat. Telegram. 16 Mar 26 15:17:04. [Link to Post](#)
79. Russian Federation | General. Ящик Пандоры Chat. Telegram. 16 Mar 26 13:19:05. [Link to Post](#)
80. Russian Federation | General. Смуглянка. Telegram. 20 Mar 26 14:25:51. [Link to Post](#)
81. Russian Federation | General. Ящик Пандоры Chat. Telegram. 16 Mar 26 15:17:04. [Link to Post](#)
82. Russian Federation | General. Молдоване. Telegram. 22 Mar 26 15:15:06. [Link to Post](#)
83. Russian Federation | General. Alexei Lungu. Telegram. 22 Mar 26 15:24:21. [Link to Post](#)
84. Ukraine. X. 17 Mar 26 20:06:32. [Link to Post](#)
85. Alignment Unspecified. moldovalive.md/feed/. undefined. 18 Mar 26 07:43:44. [Link to Post](#)
86. Alignment Unspecified. moldovalive.md/feed/. undefined. 18 Mar 26 07:43:44. [Link to Post](#)
87. Russian Federation | General. Gagauznews / Комментарии. Telegram. 18 Mar 26 14:59:05. [Link to Post](#)
88. Ukraine. X. 17 Mar 26 16:59:05. [Link to Post](#)
89. Ukraine. X. 17 Mar 26 16:18:39. [Link to Post](#)
90. Russian Federation | General. Кочегарка. Telegram. 16 Mar 26 11:37:33. [Link to Post](#)
91. Republic of Lithuania. ♦️ Karas Ukrainoje ♦️ Apžvalga. Naujienos! Україна переможе! 🇵🇱🇺🇦. Telegram. 16 Mar 26 21:47:46. [Link to Post](#)
92. Russian Federation | General. Rybar in English. Telegram. 22 Mar 26 07:02:28. [Link to Post](#)
93. Russian Federation | General. КАВКАЗАРЬ. Telegram. 22 Mar 26 07:59:53. [Link to Post](#)
94. Russian Federation | General. КАВКАЗАРЬ. Telegram. 22 Mar 26 09:32:33. [Link to Post](#)
95. Ukraine. X. 18 Mar 26 08:17:14. [Link to Post](#)
96. Russian Federation | General. International Reporters\_eng Chat. Telegram. 19 Mar 26 18:28:25. [Link to Post](#)
97. Russian Federation | General. КАВКАЗАРЬ. Telegram. 22 Mar 26 10:31:45. [Link to Post](#)
98. Russian Federation | General. mironov\_sergey. VK. 19 Mar 26 08:59:14. [Link to Post](#)
99. Russian Federation | General. Злой журналист. Telegram. 18 Mar 26 11:53:18. [Link to Post](#)
100. Republic of Belarus. ССО|ВДВ|СПЕЦНАЗ БЕЛАРУСЬ 🇧🇪. Telegram. 20 Mar 26 07:05:37. [Link to Post](#)
101. Alignment Unspecified. Кубань 24. Новости, происшествия, ДТП. VK. 18 Mar 26 07:40:00. [Link to Post](#)
102. Russian Federation | General. X. 16 Mar 26 12:29:00. [Link to Post](#)

# Methodology

**Report Purpose.** This report analyses pro-Russian perspectives and sentiment towards NATO, the 'special military operation' in Ukraine and Russian activity in Eurasia. It considers the perspectives of Russian officials, Russian population-level commentators and influencers, and non-Russians who align with the Kremlin narrative.

**Data.** Analysis in this report is based on data collected from 1001Z 16 Mar 26 to 1000Z 23 Mar 26 using communications sources on Russian local RSS, VK, Telegram, Facebook, and X feeds. Over 4,000,000 data points were reviewed.

ExTrac collects and translates open-source communications data in real time from high-relevance, hard-to-reach, and hard-to-find sources, channels, and chatrooms associated with state and non-state actors. Our automated collectors strip all communications of sensitive metadata and Personal Data/Personal Identifiable Information (PII) and render them accessible, in real-time, in ExTrac's data lake.

Once ingested, all data streams are processed, enriched, and made available for analysis using ExTrac's AI-powered influence and kinetic activity trackers (figure A).

We interrogate these data using a range of proprietary, machine- and AI-enabled analytics tools.

**Assessments.** ExTrac assessments are derived from hand-curated data feeds and provide official and population-level perspectives on geopolitical developments. They should not be read as all-source assessments, but they do describe our assessed likelihood based on the data listed in the Methodology and using the Probability Yardstick (figure B) as released by the UK's Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis.




Figure A. Screenshot of communications feeds from the ExTrac platform





Figure B. UK's Probability Yardstick

The background features a dark space filled with numerous small, glowing yellow and white particles. Several thin, white, curved lines sweep across the scene from the left side towards the center, where they converge at a single point marked by a larger, bright yellow dot. A horizontal yellow line extends from this convergence point across the right side of the image.

## High-relevance, hard-to-reach data – compliant and analysed at scale

ExTrac is a decision intelligence company. Our AI-enabled analytics platform and bespoke intelligence reporting help customers make faster, better-informed decisions. We find, curate, and collect high-relevance, hard-to-reach data sources across the surface, deep, and dark web, delivering decision advantage at machine speed.

Our reporting products are written by in-house domain experts working with ExTrac's software platform. They use our agentic AI system to surface indicators, anomalies, and emerging patterns from the data we ingest in real time. The result is a human-machine intelligence workflow that enables analysts to surface both insight and foresight at speed and scale.

For more information please contact us at [info@extrac.ai](mailto:info@extrac.ai)

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